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In recent years, extreme weather events have 
severely affected the performance of the electric grid. very large-
scale events (vLse) with potentially catastrophic impacts on the 
grid pose more than an inconvenience in today’s electricity-driven 
lifestyle, and the frequency and severity of such events may con-
tinue to increase as a consequence of global climate change. this 
article summarizes the state of the art in leveraging distributed 
resources to improve resilience of the electric grid. It also highlights 
the technical questions that need to be addressed through additional 
research and development if the value of distributed resources is to 
be maximized. 
VLSE Costs and Mitigation Strategies
the electric grid represents a critical vulnerability of modern soci-
ety. vLses associated with catastrophic failures of the electric grid 
and other infrastructure have occurred with increasing frequency 
and severity in recent years, a trend that may continue in the face 
of climate change. a 2014 report by the U.n. Intergovernmental 
Panel on climate change (IPcc) addresses the vulnerability and 
exposure of human systems and infrastructures to climate-related 
extremes such as floods, cyclones, and wildfires and also points out 
a significant lack of preparedness for current climate variability in 
countries at all levels of development.
along with intentional violations of the cyber and physical 
security of the electric grid, the issue of resilience with respect 
to vLses has attracted the attention of governments, the power 
industry, and electric customers. It is also important to recognize 
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that the impacts of vLses extend far beyond the electric 
grid because of the high level of interdependency among 
infrastructure networks in sectors such as communication, 
transportation, and water supply. Figure 1 illustrates the 
growing number of natural disasters in the United states 
that have caused more than a billion U.s. dollars’ worth of 
damages. note that the total social, political, and economic 
impacts resulting from a lack of access to electricity could 
exceed these estimated damages.
severe weather is already the 
leading cause of power outages in 
the United states, accounting for 
87% of outages according to the 
2013 report of the executive Of-
fice of the U.s. President. a recent 
congressional study estimates the 
average annual cost of outages re-
lated to severe weather at between 
Us$25 billion and Us$70 billion. 
Distribution networks are the most 
vulnerable parts of the electric 
grid. It has been estimated that 
90% of electricity customer outag-
es in the United states are related 
to distribution network problems. 
 Figure 2 shows the number of 
power outages related to weather 
conditions; it is based on a database maintained by the en-
ergy Information administration of the U.s. Department of 
energy (DOe). 
Interdependencies among infrastructure components cre-
ate the risk of cascading effects during and after a vLse. 
moreover, utilities investing in the smart grid and mod-
ernization are implementing advanced information tech-
nologies and new media for communication, control, and 
figure 1. The number of natural disasters in the United States with more than a bil-
lion U.S. dollars’ worth of damages.
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computation. It is generally expected that cybercomponents 
and applications will increase the operability, reliabil-
ity, and controllability of the grid. But they also introduce 
greater vulnerability to cascading effects via cyber-physical 
interdependencies.
the cyber and physical resilience of transmission and 
distribution (t&D) networks must be a temporal, agile, and 
holistic practice that makes the electric grid less vulnerable 
to outages and reduces the time of service recovery. many 
U.s. utilities now have initiatives to improve grid resilience 
and the responsiveness of loads. examples include programs 
for t&D grid reinforcements; smart grid technology imple-
mentations (e.g., automated demand response); reliable and 
interoperable communication infrastructure; better vegeta-
tion management; extended mutual aid agreements; incident 
management process improvements; and emergency pre-
paredness. there are several related multiutility initiatives 
led by utility organizations, as well as initiatives led by 
federal and state government agencies to improve grid resil-
ience. For example, the Federal emergency management 
agency (Fema) has implemented the Incident command 
system, and the U.s. Department of homeland security has 
initiated various programs to protect critical infrastructure, 
such as the DOe-led emergency support Function 12, aimed 
at improving preventive measures, restoration, and recovery 
of energy supply systems. the connecticut legislature is also 
providing microgrid grants and loans to enhance emergency 
preparedness and response. 
hardening the distribution network is the other approach 
for preventing or mitigating the catastrophic effects of 
weather-related disruptions. structurally reinforcing towers 
and poles is one effective way to increase robustness. vegeta-
tion management is crucial for preventing faults, especially 
in distribution networks. Utility customers with sensitive 
loads guard against vLses by hardening their networks and 
increasing their on-site backup and renewable generation 
capabilities, their storage capacity, and their participation in 
demand response programs. Federal and state governments 
are committing r&D funds to 
accelerate the development of the 
requisite technology and stan-
dards; a recent example is the 
DOe-led initiative to standardize 
the microgrid interface. 
this article proposes that one 
of the crucial values of distributed 
resources to society stems from 
their contribution to grid resilience 
during emergency operating con-
ditions associated with vLses. 
Distributed resources—including 
standby generation, distributed 
generation, distributed storage, 
microgrids, and demand response 
mechanisms—can play an impor-
tant role in helping the grid survive and recover from extreme 
events. with rapidly maturing technologies and growing pen-
etrations of distributed resources, their potential to provide 
local energy (or “negawatts”) as well as more advanced ancil-
lary services including operating reserve, spinning reserve, 
frequency regulation, and voltage regulation is being recog-
nized. to date, these capabilities have been primarily consid-
ered in the context of t&D network operations, often in terms 
of the challenges involved in integrating various advanced 
distributed resources functionalities with the legacy distribu-
tion infrastructure. 
the supporting role of distributed resources for resilience 
during and after a vLse reflects a combination of the roles 
of central generating units at the transmission level, switch-
ing operations at the distribution level, and customer-side 
response strategies. they include provision of local energy 
and ancillary services, support for essential congestion 
management, and restoration processes, including islanding 
schemes that are adaptive to circumstances. some of these 
roles are understood and proven while others remain to be 
investigated and demonstrated. 
It is vital that we fully explore the role that distributed 
resources can play to enhance grid resilience. Indeed, the 
response to vLses could prove a crucial test for distributed 
resources capabilities—or, if we fail to prepare, an opportu-
nity lost.
Assessing Grid Resilience  
with Distributed Resources 
resilience with respect to vLses requires knowledge of a 
system’s behavior and its ability to flexibly accommodate 
quick changes without a severe decline in performance. 
resilience therefore begins with electric grid identifica-
tion and the characterization of distributed resources. 
Distribution network topology, network physical charac-
teristics, operational constraints, and distributed resource 
capacities are all clarified in the network identification 
step. the next step is network vulnerability analysis. the 
figure 2. The number of bulk power outages related to U.S. weather conditions.
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figure 3. A resilience assessment framework for power T&D networks.
consequences of disturbances or 
disruptive events are time depen-
dent, as are the system’s adaptive 
responses and its recovery speed. 
vulnerability analysis therefore 
requires taking into account sys-
tem response before, during, and 
after disturbances. 
resilience operation is another 
part of the system resilience 
framework. the ultimate goal of 
a resilient system is to maintain 
system functionality after dis-
turbing events. resilience opera-
tion control defines new settings 
and equilibrium points for the 
distributed resources. It has two 
main components: “grid recovery 
potential” and “grid absorbing 
potential.” this means that the 
system can absorb disturbances, adapt itself to the disturb-
ing events, then recover fast enough to mitigate disturb-
ing event consequences.  Figure 3  illustrates this resilience 
assessment framework for the  electric grid.
Disturbance absorption in t&D networks depends on a 
range of factors that include component design characteristics, 
system topology, control philosophy, and protection coordina-
tion. the recovery potential is also characterized by the speed 
of the power system’s return to its normal or restorative state. 
as mentioned above, the majority of physical vulnerabili-
ties are related to the disruption of overhead distribution and 
transmission lines following severe weather. Faults caused 
by contact between conductors and ground are a major 
source of service interruptions, safety hazards, and fires; 
transformers are second among the most vulnerable compo-
nents in t&D networks. hardening the t&D system is one 
approach to prevent or mitigate the catastrophic impact of 
weather-related disruptions. structural reinforcements and 
vegetation management are thus among the most effective 
actions that can be taken to increase robustness. 
Beyond robustness, however, system resilience involves 
active adaptation to conditions during and after disruptive 
events. By introducing a vast range of new possibilities for 
operating and control actions that can be taken at the distri-
bution level, the presence of distributed resources brings a 
fundamentally new complexity to resilience analysis. these 
possibilities need to be studied carefully so that existing 
assets can be leveraged for maximal advantage—not if but 
when the next vLse occurs. 
Overview of Distributed Energy  
Resource Technologies
In this article we use the term distributed resources to 
refer to distributed energy resources (Ders) as well as 
demand response (Dr) resources. On the generation side, 
Ders include resources such as solar Pv that are typically 
installed by electric customers on their side of the meter, 
either to increase reliability or to partially supply the cus-
tomer’s own load to reduce the electric bill. their operation 
is subject to an interconnection agreement with the local 
electric utility. most such agreements require compliance 
with applicable engineering standards (primarily Ieee 
1547) and are intended to ensure that the Der interconnec-
tion is safe, does not adversely affect power quality for other 
customers, and is compliant with regulatory rules. the exact 
requirements vary by resource size and are more restrictive 
for larger resources. the Ieee 1547 standard and many of 
the regulations related to interconnection of Der are evolv-
ing in reaction to the increased penetration of Ders and the 
emergence of smart grid technology. Interconnections that 
fall under federal jurisdiction because they sell into whole-
sale markets, even if connected at the distribution level, are 
subject to standard procedures and agreements established 
in the United states by the Federal energy regulatory 
commission (Ferc)—for example, the small Generator 
Interconnection Procedures. all of the above standards and 
procedures are vitally important because they define what 
Ders can and cannot do in response to grid disturbances.
Ders also include small-scale generation and storage 
technologies owned and operated by utilities or service pro-
viders at the distribution voltage level. such resources may be 
either stationary or mobile. moreover, Dr can be considered 
as a Der source. so-called “emergency Dr” is employed to 
avoid involuntary service interruptions during times of supply 
scarcity. this could be one strategy employed during vLses. 
For customers and distributed resources interested in partici-
pating in Dr programs and receiving notifications of emer-
gency and load change requests during vLses, the key will 
be providing reliable data and communication that are secure 
and can interoperate efficiently with electric grid systems.
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Distributed Resources  
Operation: Current Practices
this section describes the most common industry practices 
today related to the operation of the distributed resources 
described above. the focus of our discussion is on emer-
gency operating conditions prior to, during, and following 
a vLse. these are the conditions typically dealt with at the 
emergency operations centers (eOcs) set up by utilities to 
respond to vLses. 
Standby Generators 
Perhaps the most common application of distributed 
resources during outage conditions is the use of standby 
generators. within seconds of a utility outage, an automatic 
transfer switch senses the power loss, commands the standby 
generator to start, and then transfers the electrical load to 
the standby generator to supply power to the circuits. after 
utility power returns, the automatic transfer switch transfers 
the electrical load back to the utility and signals the standby 
generator to shut off. It then returns to standby mode, where 
it awaits the next outage. 
automatic standby generator systems may be required 
by building codes for critical safety systems such as eleva-
tors in high-rise buildings, fire protection systems, standby 
lighting, or medical and life support equipment. residential 
standby generators are increasingly common, providing 
backup electrical power to hvac systems, security systems, 
and household appliances. current interconnection agree-
ments do not allow customer-owned standby generators to 
operate during normal conditions when the customer’s load 
is fed by the utility. 
Distributed Generation (DG) 
Utilities routinely use utility-owned DG, especially mobile 
diesel generators, for support during restoration. Using cus-
tomer or third-party-owned DG in the restoration process is 
much less common. 
In many U.s. utility service territories, customers can 
install DG to offset their demand. with net metering (as is 
well known in california, for example), a customer’s excess 
generation may feed back to the utility grid during normal 
operation when output is higher than the customer’s own load. 
standard interconnection agreements generally require 
that customer-owned DG be disconnected during an outage. 
this is primarily for the protection of utility crews, who must 
be certain that everything downstream of any breaker they 
open is deenergized, allowing them to perform work with-
out risk of electrocution. there are control and anti-island-
ing mechanisms to automatically trip the DG during outage 
conditions and avoid back-feeding the distribution grid. an 
exception is when a customer disconnects from the utility grid 
(islands) but has the capability to independently serve his own 
load with DG, storage, and appropriate control. 
these standard practices do not allow for the islanding 
of a group of customers to enable them to share their DG 
during an outage, for both technical and legal reasons. a 
crucial concern is liability, since one customer’s DG could 
damage other customers’ assets by introducing power qual-
ity problems such as excessive harmonics or voltage surges 
or simply by failing to control voltage and frequency when 
attempting to balance local generation and load. Further, the 
direct trading of services among customers over utility dis-
tribution networks is normally prohibited, as current laws 
governing safety, quality of service, asset ownership, and 
economic transactions are based on the model of the utility 
as an exclusive franchise.
Energy Storage 
the current practices regarding customer energy storage 
resources are similar to those described above for standby 
generators and DG. their operation during outage condi-
tions is strictly limited to supply-only loads on the custom-
er’s side of the meter, not back-feed power into the grid. 
a number of U.s. utilities are experimenting with energy 
storage systems to improve resilience. One example is the 
Portland General electric smart Feeder demonstration proj-
ect in downtown salem, Oregon, which aims to improve dis-
tribution reliability by leveraging distributed resources such 
as energy storage, commercial DG, and Dr. 
Microgrids
a microgrid, defined as a subset of the grid that can be 
islanded (e.g., at the level of a university or corporate cam-
pus), can supply all or part of a customer’s load during an 
outage or in case of grid contingencies. again, the customer 
may not back-feed into the grid or supply third-party loads 
during outage conditions, due to safety and liability con-
cerns. In particular, multicustomer microgrids, in which 
several electrically adjacent customers are islanded together, 
are not generally permitted because existing laws govern-
ing safety, quality of service, asset ownership, and economic 
transactions generally are deficient.
Hardening the distribution network is the other approach  
for preventing or mitigating the catastrophic effects of  
weather-related disruptions.
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Demand Response
today, most demand response programs are designed to 
reduce peak demand or avoid system emergencies. these 
programs are mostly designed for system-wide participation 
of load and are not specific to a certain distribution feeder. 
some utilities (e.g., Progress energy and Pacific Gas and 
electric) are evaluating locational-based Dr within their 
Dr notification systems. some wholesale power markets 
also allow demand aggregators and large customers to con-
tribute certain ancillary services through Dr. there are also 
reported applications of Dr in managing transmission con-
gestion by transpower in new Zealand.
all of the above Dr applications are targeted for nor-
mal operating conditions or to avoid emergencies. the 
best-known application of Dr during emergency operat-
ing conditions is voluntary load reduction. as is the case 
with the Der resources, current regulations for fran-
chises granted to public utilities do not allow a customer’s 
Dr resources to be leveraged to help another customer 
during outage conditions. For example, a customer’s capa-
bility to adjust load to provide frequency regulation to the 
system cannot be leveraged if that customer is islanded 
during an outage. 
Leveraging Distributed Resources  
for Grid Resilience 
the current state of the art is largely the result of engineering 
standards and interconnection agreements that were devel-
oped when the penetration of distributed resources was low. 
Given the significant amount of distributed resources that 
already exists at many utilities and the forecast growth in 
distributed resources, it is prudent to explore whether utili-
ties could further leverage these resources in response to 
vLses. Below, we present some examples of distributed 
resources applications. In many cases, further research is 
needed to explore viability or to address current technical 
and nontechnical barriers. existing engineering standards 
and interconnection agreements would need to evolve to 
make some of these applications possible. while it may seem 
bold to suggest such changes, it is worth noting how dramati-
cally today’s landscape of renewable resource integration 
already differs from the situation one or two decades ago. 
the proposed applications are analogous to the coordinated 
operation of interconnections, in which neighboring utilities 
cooperate and cooptimize their resources for the benefit of 
the interconnection. 
Maximizing Resource Availability During VLSEs 
Utilities defer discretionary maintenance of central genera-
tion units to maximize resource availability if they predict 
a vLse. they also coordinate with neighboring utilities to 
increase reserve margins. 
currently there is little or no communication between util-
ities and Der owners related to distribution network opera-
tion during and after vLses. Increased communications 
could help the utility and the Der owners better plan and 
coordinate their response. For example, emergency condition 
alerts in media outlets could include some recommendations 
for Der owners and their neighbors. customers could ensure 
that their backup generators are ready to come on line and 
their batteries are fully charged, if the utility is anticipating a 
critical event. In conjunction with these actions, Der owners 
could communicate the status of their resources to the utility, 
and allow, for example, the coordinated disconnection and 
islanding of local microgrids from at-risk feeders. 
Riding Through Faults 
Ieee standard 1547, which is central to most interconnec-
tion agreements, requires DG to cease to energize the grid 
for all faults or major disturbances on the grid to which it is 
connected. this requirement may not be optimal when there 
is a large penetration of distributed resources that could all 
disconnect simultaneously, causing an unintended adverse 
impact on the grid. the standard should be modified to 
allow for different requirements under conditions mutually 
agreeable to the grid operator and the DG owner, especially 
during a vLse. the grid operator may then, in some cases, 
want distributed resources to ride through a fault to avoid 
bigger issues. smarter protection and automation schemes 
will need to be devised for such ride-through capability. 
Optimizing Restoration Prioritization 
most utilities prioritize the restoration of loads based on 
their importance to public health and safety, giving higher 
priority to loads designated as critical (e.g., hospitals, police 
facilities). this prioritization is normally a static process 
and does not take into account the real-time conditions in 
the field. the prioritization could be optimized, however, if 
the utilities were made aware of the status of the distributed 
resources. as an example, if a utility knew that a certain cus-
tomer had islanded, was supplying his own critical load, and 
was able to continue to do so for 24 h, the utility could then 
focus its effort on other critical loads that were completely 
Distributed resources by and large  
can provide many of the same energy and ancillary services  
that central resources can provide.
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without power or were islanded but cannot sustain them-
selves for many more hours. 
such a coordination of restoration priority could be 
implemented today without any insurmountable technical 
barriers. the major technical requirement is communication 
between the utility and its customers regarding the vLse 
and the status of the resources. this particular application 
is “low-hanging fruit” that utilities could implement rapidly. 
Global Optimization of Distributed Resources
current industry practices during outage conditions impose con-
straints on the local use of customer-owned distributed resources. 
this raises the question of whether greater societal value could be 
gained if such constraints were relaxed and these resources were 
optimized more broadly (beyond an individual customer’s prem-
ises) to support resilience. some examples include: 
✔✔ scheduling distributed resources to manage congestion 
in the distribution grid and maximize its load-carrying 
capability, e.g., using distributed resources to elimi-
nate an overload on a transformer that would other-
wise require switching operations to reduce load 
✔✔ scheduling distributed resources to optimize the volt-
age profile on the feeder and eliminate overloads. 
while some distributed resources such as solar Pv are not 
dispatchable, advanced technologies such as smart invert-
ers can provide the capability for voltage regulation (and 
already do so in europe). U.s. utilities do not presently rely 
on customer resources for any such global optimization for 
a variety of reasons, including concerns about reliability; the 
dependability of non-utility-owned resources; and the logis-
tics involved in communication, control, and data integration. 
Multicustomer Microgrids
In theory, utility customers may be able to dynamically 
island several customers in a multicustomer microgrid, 
meaning a group of customers could isolate itself from the 
rest of the grid and sustain itself in that state for a period of 
time, as long as local resources and load management are 
adequate to meet the island’s needs and the physical or eco-
nomic condition prompting the islanded operation persists.
many questions need to be addressed before this practice 
could become feasible, including:
✔✔ technical issues, such as protection, control, and 
power quality
✔✔ legal issues, such as liabilities for damage to third-
party assets
✔✔ regulatory issues, particularly customer competition 
with utilities
✔✔ economic issues, including the need to create mar-
kets for energy and ancillary services from distributed 
resources and how to measure and bill for services 
exchanged among customers.
Hardening of the Distribution Grid Using 
Distributed Resources
many utilities are making investments to harden their distri-
bution grids to increase their resilience to vLses. examples 
include taking overhead feeders underground, increasing 
network redundancy, and investing in smart grid technolo-
gies. as part of such hardening initiatives, utilities can also 
invest in distributed resources that are strategically placed 
near critical loads. such placement could help:
✔✔ reduce distribution bottlenecks 
✔✔ allow special islanding schemes designed to minimize 
the loss of critical loads 
✔✔ mitigate negative consequences (e.g., stability or volt-
age issues) that may arise when the protection schemes 
automatically disconnect a large amount of customer-
owned DG (for example, in response to a fault on a 
feeder with a large penetration of renewables).
The Way Forward
the preceding discussion suggests that substantial fur-
ther research is needed in the area of resilience analysis 
and especially the recruitment of distributed resources in 
 support of resilience goals. the following is a partial list 
of topics: 
✔✔ frameworks for global optimization of distributed 
resources, especially during emergency conditions 
✔✔ data availability, monitoring systems, and communica-
tion requirements for leveraging distributed resources 
for resilience
✔✔ load balancing and frequency regulation in microgrids 
using distributed resources
✔✔ technical, legal, regulatory, and economic issues 
related to multicustomer microgrids 
✔✔ issues related to protection schemes, such as:
•	how may distributed resources ride through faults at 
the discretion of the grid operator? 
•	what protection capabilities would need to be added 
to distribution networks to allow the safe operation 
of multicustomer microgrids?
Most utilities prioritize the restoration of loads  
based on their importance to public health  
and safety.
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•	whose assets—utility assets, customer assets, or those 
of a third party—should protection relays protect first? 
•	how can we effectively detect short circuits in the 
presence of many dc-based sources such as Pv 
and storage? 
✔✔ the business case for utilities to invest in utility-owned 
distributed resources to improve resilience, vis-à-vis 
hardening the distribution grid itself 
✔✔ issues related to data and communication security 
and reliability
✔✔ issues related to the islanding of microgrids, such as:
•	standard designs for microgrid controllers
•	the detection of Der-based islands and the visibility 
of islands to the utility. 
Summary and Conclusions
Based on the previous discussion, distributed resources 
could play the following roles in resilient operation:
✔✔ Distributed resources by and large can provide many 
of the same energy and ancillary services that central 
resources can provide. 
✔✔ since most distributed resources are geographically 
and electrically closer to loads, they could be less vul-
nerable to grid component failures during a vLse.
✔✔ some leading utilities have already begun to leverage 
distributed resources during outage conditions. such 
applications are mostly limited to utility-owned dis-
tributed resources, however, and do not extend to dis-
tributed resources owned by customers or third-party 
service providers. 
✔✔ customer-owned distributed resources are generally 
shut down during outage conditions and are not lever-
aged during vLses. the only exception is when the 
customer can be islanded, in which case it can use its 
distributed resources for its own individual benefit. 
Given the significant amount of distributed resources 
already interconnected at many utilities and the forecast 
for substantial growth in distributed resources, it is prudent 
to explore whether utilities could further leverage these 
resources to increase resilience with respect to vLses. 
Opportunities to do so may grow as the redundancy in dis-
tribution grids increases as a result of network upgrades. It 
is conceivable that many of today’s distribution grids will 
evolve away from their current radial configurations, sup-
plying power from substations, into meshed networks that 
will primarily serve as “interconnection” services among 
customers, distributed resources, microgrids, and utilities. 
In this case, it will become even more important to under-
stand the potential applications of distributed resources in 
response to vLses.
a key motivation for many customers when installing 
distributed resources is to protect themselves individually 
against grid outages. For a number of good reasons, these 
distributed resources are at present not fully leveraged in a 
way that would better serve the grid in response to vLses. 
In the future, however, a number of things may change: tech-
nology may ease the inherent difficulties in safely coordi-
nating Ders; society may expect more tangible value for 
the grid from individual Ders; and vLses may increase 
in frequency and severity. significant additional research is 
needed to explore suitable solutions if the value of distrib-
uted resources is to be maximized for resilience. 
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